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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore empirically the relationship between several factors reported 
in the literature to affect the premium received by takeover target shareholders. Using a sample of 
190 successful takeovers during the period 1995-2005, our results suggest that high leveraged target 
firms' shareholders receive, on average, 13.34 percent more premium than stockholders of low 
leveraged target firms.  Controlling for leverage, target firms which have high leverage and oppose 
the takeover receive significantly larger premiums than those with high leverage but do not oppose 
the takeover. Moreover, controlling for the size of managerial ownership in target firms, the 
association between leverage and premiums becomes more significant when managerial ownership is 
high and less significant when it is low. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
his study examines the relationship between target firms' capital structure prior to the takeover 
announcement and the takeover premiums paid by bidding firms. Evidence shows that stockholders of 
target firms earn substantial excess returns around the announcement of takeovers.
1
 In the past, 
premiums paid by bidders to target firms' stockholders averaged between 35 to 47 percent.
2
 The literature reports several 
reasons, which motivate acquiring firm's management to pay more than the market value for the target's equity.
3
  
 
 Stulz (1988) and Israel (1991) suggest that the leverage ratio of the takeover target firm and the premium it 
receives from the bidder are related. Stulz argues that management, who values control and has limited personal wealth, 
uses leverage to increase its ownership and its power in the target firm during takeover contests.  Management 
accomplishes this by issuing debt and using the proceeds to repurchase shares of stock from outsiders.  The increase in 
power enables management to defeat the takeover and remain in control of the firm or extract higher premiums from the 
bidder.  Therefore, we expect to find that, in successful takeovers, high leveraged targets are offered larger premiums 
than low leveraged target. 
 
 Israel (1991) develops a model of an optimal capital structure with no ownership role. He argues that the gains 
generated by the acquisition go to shareholders of both the targets and bidders and to debtholders of target firms.  
Debtholders’ proportion of the gains increases with target leverage while that of shareholders decrease.  Consequently, if 
bidder’s shareholders capture a smaller portion of the gain when their firms acquire high leveraged targets, value-
maximizing bidders would offer lower premiums to target shareholders, and we should observe a negative relationship 
between debt levels in the target firm's capital structure and the premium paid by the bidding firm.  
 
                                                 
1 For rigorous and excellent summaries of studies that examine target firms' excess returns see Jensen and Ruback (1983), and Jarrell 
et al. (1988). 
2
 These figures are obtained from the Mergerstat Review which is published annually by Merrill Lynch Business Brokerage and 
Valuation. 
3 For a summary of the motives behind mergers and acquisitions see Halpern (1983) and Roll (1986). 
T 
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 The contribution of our study is to reconcile the conflicting predictions of Stulz (1988) and Israel (1991) models 
by empirically investigating the extent to which the target firm's capital structure explains these premiums. 
 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I reviews the related literature review; Sections II and III 
discuss data and methodology; empirical results are presented in Section IV; and Section V completes the paper with a 
summary. 
 
II. RELATED LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The literature includes other studies of the link between capital structure and premiums paid to target firms' 
shareholders.  Jensen and Ruback (1983), show that shareholders of target firms gain from takeovers. Jarrell, Brickley, 
and Netter (1988) provide an overview of the evidence of shareholder gains in successful tender offers.  Lewellen (1971) 
argues that bidders acquire firms with low leverage to benefit from their unused debt capacity. This model implies that 
value-maximizing bidders are willing to pay a higher premium for low leveraged targets.  Consistent with this prediction, 
Kim and McConnell (1977) report that total debt in the merged firms is greater than what was used by the two 
independent firms.  
 
 Winslow, Lane, and Yang (1983), Hang and Walking (1987), Kaufman (1988), and Peterson and Peterson 
(1991) document a positive relationship between premiums paid to target firms' shareholders and the utilization of cash 
as the method of payment in an acquisition.   
 
 Walking and Edmister (1985) report a negative relationship between the three-year trend in the target's debt 
levels prior to the takeover announcement and the premiums paid by bidding firms.  Examining debt levels instead of the 
trend in debt levels, Kaufman (1988) finds no relationship between premiums and the target's debt-to-equity ratio at the 
end of the year that precedes the announcement.   
 
 Israel (1991) suggests that the capital structure of the target firm affects the method bidders use to finance the 
acquisition.  While bidders acquiring high leveraged targets tend to use stock as a medium of payment, those acquiring 
low leveraged targets tend to use cash.  There is also evidence of some correlation between the medium of exchange and 
premiums paid to target firms.  Wansley et al. (1983) and Peterson and Peterson (1991) report that, because of tax 
considerations, stock exchange is associated with low premium and cash exchange with high premium.   
 
III. DATA  
 
 Our initial sample of tender offers is constructed from the Mergers and Acquisitions database on the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) tape during the period 1995-2005. To keep the tender offer in the sample, we use the following 
criteria: 
 
1. The takeover target must be independent from the bidder. This criterion eliminates target firms in which the 
bidder might have had some bargaining power prior to the announcement of the takeover.  
2. Both target and bidding firms must be publicly owned. 
3. Both the target and bidding firms must have data on:  
  (a) The COMPUSTAT Industrial Tapes for leverage ratios for two years prior to the announcement date 
and  
  (b) The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes daily rates of returns from 120 days before 
the takeover announcement to 10 days after. 
4. Both the target and the bidding firms must have data on management ownership at the end of the year prior to 
the announcement of the takeover. Management ownership data are obtained from Forms 3 and 4 filed with the 
SEC and from proxy statements filed with the SEC at the end of the year prior to the announcement date.  
5. The method of payment must be either 100 percent cash or 100 percent stock. We use this condition to be able 
to control for the effect of the method of payment because evidence shows that premiums differ in cash versus 
stock acquisitions. 
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6. The target firm must have received only one tender offer bid to eliminate the impact of multiple bids on the 
premium and must not have had any other announcement from 120 days before the tender offer announcement 
to 10 days after.  
7. The takeover offer must not be made by private groups that include target firm's  management. 
 
 A sample of 190 target firms met the above conditions.  A statistical description of the sample of target and 
bidding firms is presented in Table 1, Panels A and B.  Data in Panel A indicate that the average of debt ratios for the 
sample of target firms increases slightly from 52.37 percent to 53.82 percent during the year, which precedes the 
announcement date.  This increase is not significant.  Panel B indicates that while the change in debt ratios in the entire 
sample of target firms is not significant, ninety-three firms have significantly increased their debt ratios and ninety-seven 
have significantly decreased their debt ratios. The difference between the average increase and the average decrease in 
debt ratios is statistically significant using both parametric and non-parametric tests.  Table 3 shows that both target firms 
which increased their debt ratios and those which reduced their debt ratios end up having approximately equally 
leveraged. This finding is not consistent with the models of Stulz (1988) and Israel (1991) which predict an increase in 
target leverage during takeover contests. The capital structure of the bidding firm is essentially unchanged during this 
period.  Data also show that target firms are significantly smaller than bidding firms and within the sample of target firms 
sizes are widely dispersed; management ownership in target firms is greater than that in bidding firms. 
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of 190 targets and 190 bidders used in the study. Debta-T equals [(book value of total assets - book value of 
common equity) / book value of total assets] at the end of the Year T, (T = -2 and -1; where year 0 is the year in which the 
announcement occurs); Asset represents the book value of total assets at the end of the year that precedes the announcement date; and 
Mnghol represents the fraction of shares outstanding held by management at the end of the year that precedes the announcement date. 
Panel A 
 Targets Bidders 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Mean Stand. Deviation 
Debta-2  % 52.37 18.35 56.80 17.36 
Debta-1  % 53.82 18.39 56.67 17.59 
Asset (millions) 589.53 1735.14 5912.20 14923 
Mnghol % 31.36 30.67 13.16 20.17 
 
Panel B 
This table shows the number of target firms, which increased or reduced their debt ratios during the year that precedes the 
announcement date. It also displays the mean and the standard deviation of the change and the results of parametric and non-
parametric tests of the difference between the two means.  
Chdebta* Number of 
targets 
Mean Standard Deviation T and K statistics 
 
Significance Level 
Positive 93 0.07 0.12 8.20 0.001 
      
Negative 97 -0.04 0.06 136.46 0.001 
*Chdebta  is equal to (Debta-1 - Debta-2);  
 
 
 Table 2 displays the average premiums paid by the bidder in excess of the stock price of the target on day t (t=-
30,-15,-10,-1, and 0).  The premium is calculated as follows: (Po – Pt)/Pt 
 
Where, PO is the price per share offered by the bidding firm, and Pt is the market price per share of the target firm's 
common stock t trading days prior to the takeover announcement.
4 
Average premiums are high and are in line with those 
reported in the literature. Table 2 also shows that the cumulative average returns gained by target shareholders are 
significant. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Cumulative average excess returns are estimated using the standard event study methodology. 
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IV. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
 
 We divide the sample of 190 firms into several groups based on 1) target firms' debt levels at year-end prior to 
the takeover announcement, 2) change in debt levels during the year that precedes announcement, 3) management 
ownership of target firms at year-end prior to the announcement, and 4) method of payment. To examine the differences 
among premiums in these groups
5 
we perform several t-tests and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests.  
 
 To investigate the joint effects of those variables on the target premiums, an ordinary least square regression 
analysis is conducted using the following model: 
 
PREMIUMi = 0 + jj (j=1...n)  
 
where, Premiumi is the premium paid to the ith target’s shareholders, j is a vector of independent variables representing 
proxies for target firm's capital structure (Debta-1), management ownership  
 
(Manghold), opposition to the takeover offer (Opposed), method of payment (Method), and j is the vector of 
coefficients. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
A. Target Premiums and Cumulative Excess Returns 
 
 In this section, we examine target premiums and excess returns around the announcement day of the takeover. 
Several average premiums are calculated relative to the target’s stock price on several days prior to the announcement 
date and are reported in Table 2.  The data indicate that bidders paid significant premiums to targets’ shareholders. For 
example, the average offer purchase price per share of the target firm is 36.22 percent higher than the market price per 
share ten days prior to the takeover announcement date. Because our sample consists of only successful takeovers, our 
results suggest that bidders offered a high premium to make sure the takeover would be successful. The interesting point 
is that the average premium over the market stock price on the announcement day is 24.93 percent This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that at the time of the announcement of the takeover offer the market views the eventual 
success of the tender offer with uncertainty.  
 
 
Table 2 
Average premium, (Po  - Pt)/Pt, paid to target shareholders in excess of the market stock price of the target firm, where Po  is the price 
per share offered by the bidding firm, and  Pt is the market price per share of the target firm’s common stock t trading days prior to the 
takeover announcement (t=-30,-15,-10,–1, and 0) and cumulative excess returns for the period day –30 to day 0 where, day 0 is the 
announcement day. 
Day Average Premium % Period CAR* 
-30 44.90 (-30, -21) -0.0031 
-15 41.61 (-20, -11) 0.0100 
-10 36.22 (-10, -6) 0.0136a 
-1 28.76 (-5, -2) 0.0173a 
0 24.93 (-1, 0) 0.0895b 
*Sample size = 190. 
a  Significant at the 1 percent level;  
b  Significant at the 0.01 percent level;  
 
 
 Results in table 2 also indicate that while our findings do not show any significant cumulative average excess 
returns from day -30 to day –11 for target shareholders, we report significant cumulative average excess returns from day 
-10 to day 0.  During this eleven-day period, target firms' stockholders gain an average of 12.04 percent.  These results 
are consistent with what has been reported elsewhere in the literature.
6
 
                                                 
5 We use non-parametric tests because in some cases distributions of variables deviate from normality. 
6 For rigorous and excellent summaries of studies that examine target firms' excess returns see Jensen and Ruback (1983), and Jarrell et 
al. (1988). 
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B. Capital Structure and Premiums 
 
 The focus of the Stulz (1988) and Israel's (1991) models is on the change in the target firm's capital structure 
during takeover periods to extract high premiums from bidders. In this section, we investigate both the effect of the 
average change in target debt ratios during the year that precedes the announcement date of the takeover and the level of 
those ratios on the premiums paid by acquirers.  Results in Table 1 (Panel A) indicate that for the whole sample, target 
firms on average do not significantly increase their leverage during the takeover contests.  However, results in Panel B, 
show that 93 of the 190 target firms in our sample significantly increase their leverage and 97 firms reduced their 
leverage.  We further investigate which of the targets did in fact increase and which did decrease their debt ratios during 
the year prior to the takeover announcement date.  Our findings indicate that it is firms with relatively low debt ratios 
(mean = 45.07 percent) two years before the announcement date that add debt to their capital structure.  Target firms that 
already had relatively high debt ratios (mean = 55.40 percent) either reduce or do not change their debt ratios.  
 
 Next, we investigate the extent to which both the change in target debt ratios and the level of target debt ratios 
are correlated with premiums paid by bidding firms.  Our findings are presented in Table 3.  As shown in Panel A, there 
is no significant difference between the average premiums of 37.87 percent paid to target firms that increased their debt 
ratios and that of 35.05 percent paid to target firms that either maintained or reduced their debt ratios.  However, the 
results in Panel B show that the level of debt ratios in the year prior to the announcement of the tender offer is correlated 
with target premiums.  We observe a significant difference between the average premiums of 43.17 percent paid to 
shareholders of the target firms in the high leverage group and the average premium of 29.83 percent paid to 
shareholders in the low leverage group.   
 
 These results suggest that the target premium is related only to the size of debt ratios immediately prior to the 
announcement and not the change in leverage.  These results are consistent with that aspect of Stulz's (1988) model that 
implies a positive correlation between target firms' leverage and premiums.  However, our results are inconsistent with 
that aspect of his model, which implies a positive correlation between the direction of the change in leverage and target 
premiums.  In his model, Stulz (1988) does not mention what magnitude of the change in leverage is necessary to extract 
higher premiums.  Our findings do not support Israel's (1991) hypothesis of a negative correlation between the level of 
target debt ratios and premiums.  Furthermore, these findings are inconsistent with the findings of Walking and Edmister 
(1985) and Kaufman (1988). 
 
C. Capital structure, Management Opposition, and Premiums 
 
 Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) argue that during takeover periods target’s management increases its 
proportional ownership and voting power to either defeat the takeover attempt or extract higher premiums from the 
bidders.  We expect to find that target firms with high management ownership receive higher premiums than those with 
low management ownership. In addition, because all tender offers in our sample are successful, we expect to observe a 
positive relationship between opposition to the takeover and premiums. Opposition was not intended to defeat the offer 
but to extract higher premiums. 
 
 Data in Table 4 show that of the sample of 190 target firms, 94 target firms had debt ratios higher than the 
median (55.58%) at the end of the year prior to the announcement date.  Only 49 of these firms opposed the takeover.  
However, only 27 out of 96 target firms with low leverage (<= 55.58%) opposed the offer.  This observation suggests 
that the size of the target debt ratios and target management opposition to tender offers are not related. In this section, we 
control for the size of target debt ratios and examine the effect of management opposition on the premiums.   
 
 Our results, displayed in Table 4, show that of the 94 target firms in the high leverage sample, 49 firms oppose 
the tender offer and 45 firms do not.  The shareholders of targets that opposed the tender offer received an average 
premium of 53.69 percent while those of targets which did not oppose the tender offer received an average premium of 
31.47 percent; a difference of 22.22 percent which is significantly different from zero.  However, the average premium 
of 33.01 percent paid to those target firms in the low leverage group that opposed the tender offer is not significantly 
different from the 28.7 percent paid to those in that group that did not oppose the tender offer.   
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Table 3 
Parametric and non-parametric tests of the significance of average premiums paid to target shareholders controlling for the change in 
the debt ratios of target firms (Chdebta) during the year that precedes the announcement date (Panel A) and for the level of the debt 
ratios (Debta-1) at year-end prior to the takeover announcement date (Panel B).  
 Panel A 
                                                                       Premium 
Chdebta N Mean % Standard Deviation% T and  K Statistics Significance Level 
Positive 93 37.87 29.35 T = 0.661 0.51 
Negative 97 35.05 29.77 K = 0.197 0.66 
Panel B 
                                                                        Premium 
Debta-1 N Mean % Standard Deviation% T and K Statistics Significance Level 
> 55.58% 94 43.17 31.49 T = 3.20 0.002 
<=55.58% 96 29.83 25.06 K = 6.78 0.010 
 
Premium is the [price per share paid to target's stockholders divided by the price of the target's share ten business days before the 
announcement date] - 1. 
Chdebta is equal to (Debta-1 - Debta-2); where Debta-1 equals [(book value of total assets - book value of common equity) divided 
by book value of total assets] at the end of the year that precedes the announcement date. Debta-2 equals [(book value of total assets - 
book value of common equity) divided by book value of total assets] at the end of the second year that precedes the announcement 
date.  
Note:  the median of Debta-1 (55.58 percent) is used as a cut-off point.  
 
 
Table 4 
Parametric and non-parametric tests of the significance of average premiums paid to target shareholders controlling for the level of the 
target firm debt ratios (Debta-1) at year-end prior to the takeover announcement date and for whether the takeover attempt was 
opposed or not. 
 Debta-1 > 55.58% Debta-1 <= 55.58% 
 Opposed 
N = 49 
Unopposed 
N = 45 
Opposed 
N = 27 
Unopposed 
N = 69 
Debta-1      
Mean % 68.45 65.50 40.74 39.46 
SD %        8.75 10.11 9.38 11.01 
     
Premium     
Mean % 53.69a,b 31.47a 33.01b 28.70 
SD %        33.13 21.16 28.86 23.33 
N is the sample size. SD is the standard deviation. 
Debta-1 equals [(book value of total assets - book value of common equity) divided by book value of total assets] at the end of the year 
that precedes the announcement date.  
Premium is the [price per share paid to target's stockholders divided by the price of the target's share ten business days before the 
announcement date] - 1. 
a  For the high leveraged sample, the average premium paid to targets which oppose the takeover is significantly different from the 
average premium paid to targets which do not oppose the takeover at the 0.0001 level (t=5.34). Using a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis 
test, K = 26.82; Significance level = 0.0001. 
b  For the sample of opposed tender offers, the average premium paid to targets which have high leverage is significantly different 
from the average premium paid to targets which have low leverage at the 0.05 level (t=2.20). Using a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis 
test, K = 2.91; Significance level = 0.10. 
 
 
 Target firms in the high leverage sample that contest the tender offer receive a premium of 53.69%, while target 
firms that contest the tender offer in the low leverage sample receive a premium of 33.01%.  This difference of 20.68% is 
significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level.  These findings suggest that neither opposition nor high leverage alone 
explains the high premiums, but that it is the combined effect of both opposition and high leverage that has a significant 
effect on premiums.  These results support the models of Stulz (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) which imply that 
debt is not an effective means to extract high premiums from bidders unless it is used in conjunction with management's 
opposition to the tender offer.  The results are inconsistent with Israel's (1991) model in which opposition plays no role 
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and only capital structure affects the size of the premiums through its effects on the profitability of the acquisition to the 
acquiring firm.  
 
D. Management Ownership, Capital Structure and Premiums 
 
 Stulz (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) argue that high management ownership in target firms implies that 
bidders would have to pay high premiums for the bid to be successful.  These models contrast with Israel's (1991) model 
in which only leverage and not management ownership affects target premiums.  In this section, we explore the joint 
effects of both managerial ownership and leverage on target premiums.  To examine these effects, the total sample is first 
divided into two subsamples based on the level of management ownership.  The median management ownership of  
0.181 is used as the cut-off point and two subsamples of 95 firms each are constructed.  Theses subsamples are further 
divided into two groups based on debt levels in the year that precedes the takeover announcement. 
 
 The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.  First, the average premium of 35.24 percent paid to those 
firms with high management ownership (Panel A) is not significantly different the 37.61 percent paid to target firms with 
low management ownership (Panel B).  Thus, management ownership alone is not sufficient to distinguish between 
premiums paid by bidding firms.  However, when management ownership is combined with leverage the effect on 
premiums become significant.  When management ownership is high, as displayed in Panel A, our findings show that 
there is a significant difference between the average premium of 42.66 percent paid to target firms with high debt ratios 
and the 27.64 percent paid to firms with low debt ratios.  On the other hand, when management ownership is low, as 
displayed in Panel B, the difference in target premiums is not significant.  
 
  These results indicate that the addition of a proxy for managerial ownership adds insight into the association 
between capital structure and target premiums.  When managerial ownership is low, the impact of leverage on target 
premiums is less clear than when management ownership is high.  These results are consistent with the implications of 
the Stulz (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) models in which capital structure is associated with management's ability 
to use its control to increase bargaining power and extract higher premiums from bidders.  These results suggest that 
unless changes in debt are accompanied by greater management ownership, the effects on premiums of changes in 
leverage are not significant.  These results are not consistent with implications of Israel's (1991) model in which 
management ownership is not important and a negative relationship between debt levels and target premiums is 
predicted. 
 
 
Table 5 
Parametric and non-parametric tests of the significance of average premiums paid to target shareholders controlling for management 
ownership in targets and for the level of the target firm debt ratios (Debta-1) at year-end prior to the takeover announcement date.  
Panel A (management equity ownership > median = 18.1%) 
                                                          Premium 
Debta-1  % N Mean % Standard Deviation% T and K Statistics Significance Level 
> 54.25 48 42.66 27.67 2.67 0.009 
<= 54.25 47 27.64 23.62 8.97 0.003 
Total 95 35.24 26.61
a   
Panel B (Management equity ownership <=  median = 18.1%) 
                                                           Premium 
Debta-1 N Mean % Standard Deviation% T and K Statistics Significance Level 
> 55.81% 46 41.70 34.61 1.42 0.16 
<=55.81% 49 33.78 27.32  0.61 
Total 95 37.61 29.17
a   
Note:   to create two sub-samples we use the median of management equity ownership of 18.1 percent as a cut-off point.    
Premium is the [price per share paid to target's stockholders divided by the price of the target's share ten business days before the 
announcement date] - 1.   
Debta-1 equals [(book value of total assets - book value of common equity) divided by book value of total assets] at the end of the 
year that precedes the announcement date.  
a For the high management ownership sample, the average premium paid to targets is 35.24 percent is not significantly different from 
the average premium paid to targets with low management ownership. 
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E. Method of Payment, Leverage Level, and Premium Size 
 
 Because of the interrelationship between the medium of exchange, capital structure and the premium paid to 
target firm, we investigate their joint effects on target premiums.   
 
 Our results, presented in Tables 6 and 7, indicate no significant relationship between leverage and the method 
of payment (Panel A).  In cash takeovers, the debt ratios (mean=0.5403) are not significantly different from those in 
stock takeovers (mean=0.5314).  Moreover, the premiums paid to shareholders of target firms in cash transactions (mean 
=0.3733) is not significantly different from the premium (mean =0.3350) paid to target shareholders in stock 
transactions.   
 
Table 6 
Parametric and non-parametric tests of the significance of the relationship between the method of payment and the level of debt ratio 
(Debta-1)  in the acquired firm.  
                                                                Debta-1       
Method of Payment N Mean % Standard Deviation% T and  K Statistics Significance Level 
Cash 146 54.03 17.76 0.21 0.84 
Stock 44 53.14 27.00 1.087 0.30 
 
 
Table 7 
Parametric and non-parametric tests of the significance of average premiums paid to target shareholders controlling for the method of 
payment cash or stock. 
                                                              Premium 
Method of Payment N Mean % Standard Deviation% T and K Statistics Significance Level 
Cash 146 37.33 28.98 0.76 0.45 
Stock 44 33.50 29.55 1.06 0.30 
Premium is the [price per share paid to target's stockholders divided by the price of the target's share ten business days before the 
announcement date] - 1.   
Debta-1 equals [(book value of total assets - book value of common equity) divided by book value of total assets] at the end of the 
year that precedes the announcement date.  
 
 
 However, we report in Table 8 that high leverage is associated with high premiums in both cash and stock 
transactions.  These findings are inconsistent with those of Wansley et.al. (1983) and Peterson and Peterson (1991). 
 
 
Table 8 
Parametric and non-parametric tests of the significance of average premiums paid to target shareholders controlling for the method of 
payment and leverage.  
Panel A (method of payment is cash)  size is 146 
Premium 
Debta-1 % N Mean % Standard Deviation% T and  K Statistics Significance Level 
< 55.38 74 31.88 23.89 2.30 0.023 
>=55.38 72 42.94 32.65 4.62 0.031 
Panel B (method of payment is stock) size is 44 
Premium 
Debta-1 % N Mean % Standard Deviation% T and K Statistics Significance Level 
< 55.44 22 23.10 28.07 2.47 0.018 
>=55.44 22 43.90 27.80 4.48 0.04 
Note: the median of Debta-1 is 55.38 percent when cash is used as the method of payment and 55.44 percent when stock is used. The 
median is used as a cut-off point to create the subsamples.    
Premium is the [price per share paid to target's stockholders divided by the price of the target's share ten business days before the 
announcement date] - 1.   
Debta-1 equals [(book value of total assets - book value of common equity) divided by book value of total assets] at the end of the 
year that precedes the announcement date. 
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F. Cross-Sectional Analysis  
 
 To investigate the joint effects of several variables hypothesized to affect target premiums, the following two 
ordinary least square regressions are performed:  
where Debta-1 is the debt ratio of the target firm in the year preceding the year in which the tender offer is announced; 
Debta-1*Opposed is an interaction variable between leverage and whether or not the tender offer is opposed.  Opposed 
takes the value of 1 if the takeover is contested and 0 otherwise; Mnghol is the fraction of common shares outstanding 
owned by management at the year-end prior to the announcement; Mnghol*Opposed is an interaction variable between 
management ownership and opposition to the tender offer; and Meth is the method of payment used in the acquisition 
(Meth = 1 for stock and Meth = 0 for cash).  
 
 The results of our cross-sectional analysis are presented in Table 9. The first regression model is significant the 
0.0014 level (F=4.158) with an R
2
 of 11% (adjusted R
2
=9%).  Both target leverage and management ownership do not 
significantly affect the level of target premiums.  However, in the second regression model, which is significant the 
0.0004 level (F=7.37) with an R
2
 of 17.14 % (adjusted R
2
=14.82%), the only significant variable affecting target 
premiums is the interaction between leverage and opposition. It has a coefficient of 0.33 which is significant at the .02 
level (t=2.39).  This result is consistent with the predictions of the Stulz (1988) model.  Moreover, this result is consistent 
with the results of our univariate test in Table 4.  Our finding that the method of payment and management ownership is 
not significant is consistent with the results of our univariate analysis.   
 
 
Table 9 
Results of an ordinary least square regression using the following model: 
Premiumi = 0 + jj (j=1...n) 
Where, Premiumi is the premium paid to the ith target’s shareholders, j is a vector of independent variables representing proxies for 
target firm's capital structure (Debta-1), target management ownership (Mnghol), opposition to the takeover offer (Opposed), method 
of payment (Meth), and j is the vector of coefficients. 
 1st regression  2nd regression  
Variable Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
Intercept 0.38 4.09 a 0.290 3.81 a 
Debta-1 0.18 1.07 0.034 0.26 
Mnghol -0.17 -0.94 0.015 0.20 
Debta-1*Opposed   0.330 2.39b 
Mnghol*Opposed   -0.043 -0.28 
Meth   -0.040 -0.79 
 Sample Size = 190     Sample Size = 190 
 
 Model R2 =  11 percent    Model R2 =  17.14 percent 
 Model adjusted R2 = 9 percent   Model adjusted R2 = 14.82 percent 
 Model F-statistic = 4.16    Model F-statistic = 7.37 
 Prob > F = .0014     Prob > F = 0.0001 
Debta-1 equals [(book value of total assets - book value of common equity) divided by book value of total assets] at the end of the 
year that precedes the announcement date; Premium is the [price per share paid to target's stockholders divided by the price of the 
target's share ten business days before the announcement date] – 1; and Opposed is a proxy variable which is equal to 1 if the takeover 
offer is opposed or 0 otherwise. 
a  Significant at the 0.001 level. 
b  Significant at the 0.02 level. 
 i1i  +Mnghol +  1-Debta +  = Premium 2  
 
and 
 


i54
321i
 + Meth +Opposed] *[Mnghol + 
Mnghol +Opposed] *1-[Debta + 1-Debta +  = Premium
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VI. SUMMARY 
 
 Stulz (1988) and Israel (1991) develop models of managerial capital structure decisions in the market for 
corporate control.  Stulz's model implies a positive relationship between target firms' debt ratios and the premiums they 
receive from bidders.  Israel's model suggests the opposite.  The purpose of this paper is to empirically explore this 
relationship.  Our study is done on a sample of 190 firms that were takeover targets during the period 1995-2005. The 
results suggest the following: 
 
1.  High premiums are associated with high leverage ratios.  High leveraged target firms' shareholders receive, on 
average, 13.34 percent more premium than stockholders of low leveraged target firms.  The mere increase in 
the debt ratios in the target firms' capital structure is not associated with high premiums unless that increase is 
large and subsequently results in a high level of debt ratios. 
2. Controlling for leverage, target firms which have high leverage and oppose the takeover receive significantly 
larger premiums than those with high leverage but do not oppose the takeover. 
3.  Controlling for the size of managerial ownership in target firms, the association between leverage and 
premiums becomes more significant when managerial ownership is high and less significant when it is low. 
 
 In summary, our results support the Stulz (1988) model of a positive correlation between target firms' leverage 
ratios and premiums paid by bidders in the market for corporate control.  Our results are inconsistent with Israel's (1991) 
model. 
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